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i n f o

a b s t r a c t
There are two motivations commonly ascribed to historical actors for taking up statistics: to reduce complicated data to a mean value (e.g., Quetelet), and to take account of diversity (e.g., Galton). Different
motivations will, it is assumed, lead to different methodological decisions in the practice of the statistical
sciences. Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon are generally seen as following directly in Galton’s footsteps. I
argue for two related theses in light of this standard interpretation, based on a reading of several sources
in which Weldon, independently of Pearson, reﬂects on his own motivations. First, while Pearson does
approach statistics from this ‘‘Galtonian’’ perspective, he is, consistent with his positivist philosophy of
science, utilizing statistics to simplify the highly variable data of biology. Weldon, on the other hand,
is brought to statistics by a rich empiricism and a desire to preserve the diversity of biological data. Secondly, we have here a counterexample to the claim that divergence in motivation will lead to a corresponding separation in methodology. Pearson and Weldon, despite embracing biometry for different
reasons, settled on precisely the same set of statistical tools for the investigation of evolution.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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What are the various motivations for taking up the tools of
statistics? Put differently, what is it that draws historical actors toward viewing their subjects in a statistical manner? Two answers
traditionally present themselves.1 First, one might use statistics to
simplify vastly complicated data, reducing it to the mean in order to
construct a picture of ‘‘the average man.’’ This position is all but synonymous with the name of Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874), who
coined the very phrase l’homme moyen (Porter, 1986, p. 52). As Ian
Hacking describes it, Quetelet began with the normal curve, previously derived as either an error curve or the limit-distribution of the
result of games like coin-tossing, and he ‘‘applied the same curve to
biological and social phenomena where the mean is not a real quantity
at all, or rather: he transformed the mean into a real quantity’’ (1990, p.
107, original emphasis). This shift created not a real individual, but
rather ‘‘a ‘real’ feature of a population’’ (1990, p. 108). Quetelet then

uses his average man to ‘‘represent this [population] by height [or
some other character], and in relation to which all other men of the
same nation must be considered as offering deviations that are more
or less large’’ (Quetelet in 1844, quoted in Hacking, 1990, p. 105).
On the other hand, one might use statistics to attempt to model
diversity, to study a statistical distribution with the intent of capturing outliers. Francis Galton (1822–1911), as Hacking tells the
story, is a paradigm of this motivation for statistical study. Galton
concerns himself, again on Hacking’s picture, with ‘‘those who
deviate widely from the mean, either in excess or deﬁciency’’
(Galton in 1877, quoted in Hacking, 1990, p. 180).2 Hacking calls
this a ‘‘fundamental transition in the conception of statistical laws,’’
a shift toward Galton’s ‘‘fascination with the exceptional, the very
opposite of Quetelet’s preoccupation with mediocre averages’’
(1990, p. 181).3

E-mail address: cpence@nd.edu
For example, in Porter (1986), Hacking (1990) or even Igo (2007).
It is notable that this picture of Galton is up for debate—I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that Galton’s work on composite portraits (e.g., Galton, 1879) looks
much like Quetelet’s use of ‘‘averaging.’’
3
A more metaphysical and less ‘‘historicized’’ version of this thesis is discussed in illuminating detail by Sober (1980).
1
2
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A larger conclusion is usually drawn here. The precise statistical
methods one uses will, it is said, greatly diverge depending on
which motivation one has for taking up statistical practice, a fact
which should perhaps not at all surprise us. After all, as Larry
Laudan famously argued, our methods ‘‘exhibit the realizability’’
of our aims, and those aims in turn justify our methods (1984, p.
63). In the speciﬁc case of statistics, Victor Hilts goes so far as to
claim that this is a fair explanation of the fact that Galton, rather
than Quetelet, made the ﬁrst steps toward the theories of regression and correlation (Hilts, 1973). Hacking summarizes this
position: ‘‘Thus where Quetelet was thinking of a central tendency,
and hence of the mean, Galton, always preoccupied by the exception, was thinking of the tails of the distribution, and of the dispersion’’ (1990, p. 185). This differing emphasis led to Galton’s focus
on correlation coefﬁcients, and hence his derivation of the theories
of regression and correlation. In another example from biology,
Nils Roll-Hansen describes Wilhelm Johannsen’s use of statistics
in terms similar to Quetelet’s: quoting Johannsen writing in
1896, he notes that the normal curve ‘‘described how ‘the various
properties of individuals belonging to a species or race vary around
an average’ expressing a ‘type’’’ (2005, p. 44). Further, this motivation led to his rejection of ‘‘‘German dogmas’ like the law of
correlation claiming that certain traits were linked and could not
be separated’’ (Roll-Hansen, 2005, p. 44). Again, we have
Quetelet-inspired aims precluding the use of Galtonian methods.
Let us move a bit farther ahead, to the most inﬂuential and
important disciple of Francis Galton: Karl Pearson (1857–1936).
The work of the biometrical school of Karl Pearson and W. F. R.
Weldon (1860–1906) around the turn of the twentieth century
provided one of the most signiﬁcant contributions to the debate
surrounding heredity and variation in the period between the
death of Darwin and what has been called the ‘‘eclipse of Darwinism’’ created by the advancement of Mendelian genetics and other
non-Darwinian theories of variation (Bowler, 1992; Huxley, 1942).
Pearson was a pioneer in statistics, and his work on evolutionary
theory was regularly interspersed with studies in statistical theory,
the latter often being derived as needed to solve the problems of
the former.
With respect to the motivational dichotomy with which we began, Pearson is generally remembered as a Galtonian, having taken
over leadership of Galton’s Eugenics Laboratory (Magnello, 1999a,
1999b) and written a laudatory, three-volume biography of Galton
(Pearson, 1914, 1924, 1930). Weldon, to the extent that he is ever
considered independently of Pearson, is squarely placed in the
same camp, having published his ﬁrst statistical-biological article
under the direct mathematical guidance of Galton (Weldon,
1890). This gives them both, and the biometrical school in turn, a
very obvious place within the history of statistics.
I wish to argue for two related theses in light of this traditional
view. First, if we look at Weldon’s philosophy and motivation on its
own, independent from that of Pearson, we can, despite their mutual connection to Galton, see an important and subtle difference
between the two men with respect to their motivation for engaging in statistical practice. Pearson views statistics as part of a
project consistent with his broader positivist philosophy of
science—statistics is an appropriate tool to bring to biological data
in order to simplify them and reduce them to their underlying

mathematical laws. Weldon, on the other hand, appears more focused on the preservation of diversity, arguing that only statistics
allows us to take account of the real variability present in the biological world.
Having made such a distinction, however, we can see an immediate and related problem in this common narrative in the history
of statistical practice. For while Pearson and Weldon signiﬁcantly
differ in their motivation for engaging in statistics, they use
precisely the same statistical methods—the highly rigorous mathematical tools of biometry. In other words, it is entirely possible
to enter the practice of statistics with differing motivations and
subsequently converge upon the same statistical methodology.
Pearson and Weldon provide us with a spectacular, as well as unusual, example of such a case.
I will begin by attempting to lay out a new view of Pearson’s
motivation for engaging in statistics, consonant with his philosophy of science, his prescriptions on methodology, and the
conclusions of recent biographical work. I will then consider a
much-neglected debate between Weldon, Pearson, and a few of
their opponents. We ﬁnd here our ﬁrst evidence of the distance between Weldon and Pearson—a philosophical disagreement that
one would not expect on the traditional view of their relationship.
I will then turn to developing a new conception of Weldon’s motivation for engaging in statistics, grounded in a broader reading of
Weldon’s own philosophy of science, reconstructed in particular
from the few sources in which Weldon self-consciously reﬂects
on questions of philosophy and motivation. Weldon’s view of science brought him to statistics by a profoundly different route than
the positivism of Pearson.
There is a substantial body of literature on the history of biometry, particularly on the contentious debates between the biometricians and various proponents of discontinuous (and later,
Mendelian) evolution, including William Bateson.4 Weldon’s work,
however, has generally been seen only within Pearson’s shadow.5 I
hope, in the end, to demonstrate that the lack of study of his thought
is much to be regretted: Weldon’s philosophy of science, and his reasons for adopting the biometrical method, are far more interesting
than the usual stories would lead us to believe, and can direct us
to insights not just about Weldon himself, but also about Pearson
and even the general history of the development of statistics.
1. Pearson and statistics
In addition to being a pioneer in statistics, Pearson was a profound philosopher of science in his own right, and was intensely
reﬂective about his methodology and motivations. His philosophy
of the physical sciences in particular, as expressed in his completion of W. K. Clifford’s Common Sense of the Exact Sciences and his
own Grammar of Science, was extensively developed, and, while
formulated independently from the views of Ernst Mach (with
whom Pearson corresponded only late in his career),6 bears much
resemblance to Mach’s positivism.7
Jean Gayon offers us a helpful place to begin by condensing
Pearson’s philosophy of science into three broadly positivist tenets:
(1) science rests ultimately only on phenomena; (2) scientiﬁc laws
economize our thought regarding these phenomena (by reducing
them to mathematical formulae); and (3) science must not engage

4
Notably, I am forced to pass over the importance of this debate to the sociology of science; see Mackenzie (1978, 1979, 1981) and Norton (1978) for the sociological
perspective, as well as Roll-Hansen (1980) and Olby (1989) for qualiﬁcations. See also Kim (1994) for a helpful dissection of the various classes of participants in these debates.
Finally, see Cock & Forsdyke (2008) for a biography of William Bateson.
5
For Weldon, the best biographical source is still Pearson’s obituary (1906), though see, for example, Radick (2011), with signiﬁcant insight into Weldon’s work. Pearson’s life is
extensively detailed in Porter (2004).
6
See Thiele (1969) for their correspondence.
7
While several authors, such as Alexander (1964), Kevles (1985), and Plutynski (2006) argue that Pearson is best seen as a ‘‘Machian,’’ Porter’s recent biography places such a
causal connection between Mach and Pearson in substantial doubt. See Porter (2004).
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in metaphysical speculation (Gayon, 2007). Biometry can be readily
seen to exemplify all three of these basic principles.
First, we have the phenomenological basis of science. Biometry
consists crucially in the search for empirical trends in observed data.
The extent to which this was adopted as a central claim in biometrical methodology can be seen as early as 1893, in the ﬁrst paper
produced from the collaboration of Pearson and Weldon. In it, Weldon claims that statistical investigation is ‘‘the only legitimate basis for speculations’’ regarding evolutionary theory: the study of
phenomena is the only appropriate method in biology (Weldon,
1893, p. 329).
Second, we may turn to the economization of thought by mathematics. Pearson seems to adopt this unequivocally, equating the
concepts of formula, law, and cause—all natural laws are merely
mathematical formulas, and to describe the causes at work in a
system just is to describe the laws (or formulas) governing it. Most
directly, he says in the Grammar of Science that the last step of the
scientiﬁc method is ‘‘the discovery by aid of the disciplined imagination of a brief statement or formula, which in a few words resumes the whole range of facts. Such a formula. . .is termed a
scientiﬁc law. The object served by the discovery of such laws is
the economy of thought’’ (1892, p. 93). Further evidence for this
view may be found throughout his other work on biometry. In
one of Pearson’s many ‘‘Mathematical Contributions’’ articles, he
mentions, regarding fertility, that ‘‘if it be correlated with any
inherited character . . . then we have a source of progressive
change, a vera causa of evolution’’ (Pearson, Lee, & Bramley-Moore,
1899, p. 258). This cause is to be investigated, not merely by asserting the existence of a correlation, but by determining the precise
mathematical law which relates the quantities at issue (Pearson
et al., 1899, p. 267). Pearson is noticeably silent about what would
constitute the appropriate mathematical laws for biology, but it
might be inferred, on the basis of his enthusiasm for his version
of Galton’s Law of Ancestral Heredity, that this was the sort of
thing he had in mind: a law which could tell us the expected deviation of an offspring from the generation mean based on the characteristics of its parents, grandparents, and so on.8
Such claims abound in Pearson’s Grammar of Science. Commenting on the concept of ‘‘laws of nature,’’ he says that
law in the scientiﬁc sense only describes in mental shorthand
the sequences of our perceptions. It does not explain why those
perceptions have a certain order, nor why that order repeats
itself; the law discovered by science introduces no element of
necessity into the sequence of our sense-impressions; it merely
gives a concise statement of how changes are taking place.
(Pearson, 1892, p. 136)
This view of laws supports the understanding of science as
economizing our thought from, as it were, another direction—by
claiming that natural law, the supposedly basic explanation for
the necessary connections holding within nature, cannot perform
the role demanded of it by traditional ideas of causality.
Importantly, Pearson’s view of causation creates a high bar for
science—we must know quite a bit about the system under investigation in order to construct relationships of the sort that he demanded. In a paper read at the end of 1895 and published in the
Transactions of the Royal Society for 1896, Pearson seems skeptical
that biological causes can be found, given the current level of
knowledge: ‘‘The causes in any individual case of inheritance are
far too complex to admit of exact treatment; and up to the present
the classiﬁcation of the circumstances under which greater or less
degrees of correlation . . . may be expected has made but little progress’’ (Pearson, 1896b, p. 255). That is, the complexity of biological

8
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systems makes the project of delineating their formal structure
with precision incredibly difﬁcult, and the completion of such a
project has, in Pearson’s view, been far from successful.
One more example may be cited. In the second edition of the
Grammar of Science, published in 1900, Pearson adds the following
(my emphasis):
In the last chapter we freely used the words ‘evolution’ and
‘selection’ as if they had current common values. Now this is
very far from being the case, and it is accordingly desirable to
give to these terms and to other subsidiary terms deﬁnite and
consistent meanings. It is only within the last few years, however, with the growth of a quantitative theory of evolution, that
precise deﬁnition of fundamental biological concepts has
become possible. (Pearson, 1900, p. 372, emphasis added)
It is worthy of note that in the intervening years between 1895 and
1900, Pearson seems to have become substantially more optimistic
about the odds for success of a ‘‘quantitative theory of evolution.’’
Pearson sees the introduction of biometrical methods as the only
way by which we can expose the true scientiﬁc, lawlike, or causal
(all three identical for Pearson) foundations of biological concepts.
This position might seem odd, until we consider that such a grounding for biology consists of a description of the mathematical dependence of phenomena on one another. In this light, Pearson’s
philosophy of science appears broadly uniﬁed.
This focus on statistical/causal laws was also noticed by Pearson’s son, who, in his two-part obituary for his father, mentions
that, given the tenor of the nascent biometrical method as
espoused in the ﬁrst (1892) edition of the Grammar of Science, this
process was all but inevitable:
Looking back it is easy to follow where these trends of thought
led, almost at once, in action: to an interest in Galton’s Law of
Ancestral Heredity; to a more accurate statement of this Law,
involving the development of the theory of multiple correlation; to the testing of its adequacy as a descriptive formula by
an extensive collection and analysis of data on inheritance . . . .
(Pearson, 1936, pp. 216–217)
In other words, the very essence of the biometrical school, for
Pearson, led almost inexorably to the utilization of an entirely
functional notion of cause—the attempt to ﬂesh out descriptive,
mathematical laws which can summarize extensive amounts of
data.
Finally, we may turn to the third positivist tenet underlying
Pearson’s philosophy of science, the avoidance of ‘‘metaphysical
speculation.’’ Arid theorizing about the material basis of heredity
or the precise physiological or causal signiﬁcance of observational
results, Pearson argues, will do nothing but damage the progress of
the science. Empirical grounding is the way to avoid mere blind
guessing, as Weldon, collaborating with Pearson, insisted in 1895:
These [statistical results] are all the data which are necessary, in
order to determine the direction and rate of evolution; and they
may be obtained without introducing any theory of the physiological function of the organs investigated. The advantage of
eliminating from the problem of evolution ideas which must
often, from the nature of the case, rest chieﬂy upon guess-work,
need hardly be insisted upon. (Weldon, 1895a, p. 379)
This claim rings strongly of both a grounding in phenomena and a
reticence to engage in metaphysical speculation unwarranted by
available data. Even more striking is Pearson’s complaint, expressed
in his extended 1896 article on panmixia (i.e., random mating, or,
for Pearson, the effect of completely random interbreeding without

See Froggatt & Nevin (1971) for more information on the form and development of the law of ancestral heredity.
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the inﬂuence of natural selection), that the current lack of progress
in biology is
largely owing to a certain prevalence of almost metaphysical
speculation as to the causes of heredity, which have usurped
the place of that careful collection and elaborate experiment
by which alone sufﬁcient data might have been accumulated,
with a view to ultimately narrowing and specialising the circumstances under which correlation was measured. (Pearson,
1896b, p. 255)
When we look at Pearson’s considered philosophy of science,
then, it is no wonder that he found himself attracted to the biometrical methodology. Kevles describes Pearson as being drawn to
biology because it was ‘‘rife with speculative concepts . . . that purported to explain vital phenomena yet were beyond operational
test. He found [the biometrical] program appealing because of its
positivist determination to deal only with directly observable
quantities’’ (Kevles, 1985, p. 29). And a further conclusion can be
drawn. Pearson’s work, throughout his revisions of the Grammar
of Science, remained emphatic about the usefulness of science for
the economy of thought. The complexity of organisms is undeniable,
as is our relative inability to specify with any true precision their
internal workings. Biological data is thus a vast, tangled web of
observations—on various characteristics, of different organisms,
at different times, in different environments. We need the statistical method in biology so that we can simplify our way out of this
tangle: only through statistics can we hope to offer economized
laws of nature, which can encapsulate this data in a comprehensible manner. E. S. Pearson, writing about his father’s reasons for
leaving the study of evolution, claimed that ‘‘in the growing complexity of the Mendelian hypothesis,’’ Pearson ‘‘could not see those
simple descriptive formulae which held so important a place in his
conception of scientiﬁc law’’ (Pearson, 1936, p. 241).
Statistics is thus useful for establishing the vera causa of evolution, as Pearson describes it, not only because it lets us capture the
outliers in some particular statistical distribution, but more importantly because we can then continue onward, simplifying and economizing our thought regarding biological systems, distilling those
biological processes into mathematical, functional laws—the only
things which Pearson would recognize as ‘‘causes.’’ This, then, is
Pearson’s motivation for engaging in the biometrical program—
the reduction of biological complexity to simple, functional laws,
phrased in terms of statistics.
Two clariﬁcations of Pearson’s philosophy should be raised
here. First, we have substantial evidence that Pearson’s philosophy
of science was not merely positivist. It was, as detailed especially by
Porter (2004), a strange amalgam of inﬂuences, some of which are
positivist, some based in German idealism, and some grounded in
Pearson’s political views. None of these other philosophical inclinations, however, do a better job than positivism of explaining Pearson’s motivation for engaging in statistics. Fundamentally,
positivism is clearly a sufﬁcient explanation for Pearson’s use of statistics—statistics clearly does economize our thought in the way
Pearson valued. Moreover, we have much direct documentary evidence that Pearson viewed statistics in a profoundly positivist
manner—it is positivism to which he returns time and again
throughout the very papers in which he elaborates the biometrical
methodology, and it is positivism to which his son ascribes his
reluctance to engage in Mendelian genetics. Such evidence is simply lacking with respect to any other explanation for the motivation behind Pearson’s statistical project.
9

Second, it is certainly true that Pearson is often very concerned
with the preservation of outliers, complex distributions, and so
forth: Pearson can hardly be said to want to simplify or reduce
all statistical distributions to mean values, as, for example, did
Quetelet.9 Pearson worked extensively with non-normal distributions, in what could be argued was an attempt to preserve their
structure, or their variability (e.g., Pearson, 1894a, 1895). In a review
harshly titled ‘‘Dilettantism in Statistics,’’ Pearson rails against an
investigator who reduces his data to a simple normal curve, discarding the distribution’s important skewness, which Pearson claims
constitutes the data’s only important characteristic (Pearson,
1894b). Further, Stephen Stigler even reports that Weldon was angry
with Pearson during the writing of the paper on crabs because he refused to take Weldon’s suggestion to remove the outliers from his
curves (Stigler, 1990, pp. 337–338).10
In evaluating this aspect of Pearson’s work, we must be careful
to separate two distinct features of Pearson’s thought. On the one
hand, we have his methodological prescription that we must always preserve outlying points, skew distributions, and so forth.
On the other hand, we have the issue of Pearson’s motivation for
engaging in the statistical method in the ﬁrst place. On the ﬁrst
point, I have no wish to argue that Pearson’s statistical methodology was as simple as Quetelet’s—such a claim is obviously ludicrous when applied to a mathematician as sophisticated as
Pearson. But importantly, his technical methodology is consistent
with several motivations for statistical practice—positivism foremost among them.
Turning to Pearson’s harsh criticism of reduction to a normal
curve, the ‘‘simple descriptive formulae’’ that Pearson’s son described as so central to his father’s view of scientiﬁc law should,
to borrow an old cliché, be as simple as possible, but no simpler.
I think we see in Pearson’s critical review an instance of Pearson
attacking oversimpliﬁcation—a perfectly acceptable critique even
on positivist grounds. At the same time, the reason that we engage
in statistical work in the ﬁrst place is because of its exceptional
ability to provide us with the descriptive formulae that positivism
places at the center of scientiﬁc research. Pearson and Weldon may
have in fact disagreed about whether a given data point was (biologically) legitimate or not, but this disagreement fails to speak to
the two men’s fundamental motivation behind the practice of
statistics.
It is to Weldon’s motivation that we should now turn, beginning
by attempting to separate Weldon’s view of science from that of
Pearson—pulling Weldon out from under Pearson’s gargantuan
shadow.
2. Weldon and the Nature debate
On the traditional reading of the relationship between Pearson
and Weldon, we would expect the two men to view statistics in
precisely the same way. As the story usually goes, Weldon is the
empirically-minded biologist who approaches Pearson when he
feels his experimental problems might be helped by statistical
methods. Beyond this point, Pearson and Weldon are deemed to
be all but philosophically, methodologically, and motivationally
identical.11
It is understandable that this is the accepted reading of their
relationship. Extracting a distinct view of Weldon’s thought is a
difﬁcult enterprise for several reasons. No comprehensive biography of Weldon has yet been prepared, and he was a strict naturalist
of the highest order—his published articles rarely stray from

I thank Theodore Porter for encouraging me to review this side of Pearson’s thought.
In fact, Weldon is lamenting in this letter that Pearson is often more concerned with applying complicated statistical analyses than adhering to biological accuracy.
11
Froggatt & Nevin (1971, pp. 3–4), describe them both as drawn to the same problems by the same reading of Galton’s Natural Inheritance. Sloan (2000, p. 1071), and Norton
(1978, p. 4), have a similar reading of their early relationship, though Sloan complicates Weldon’s later development.
10
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relatively straightforward reporting of the biological data which he
devoted his entire (and, sadly, too-short) career to collecting. Weldon, unlike Pearson, very rarely stopped to consider the philosophical and motivational grounding of his own methods.
I will explore three sources in order to separate Weldon’s motivation for engaging in the biometrical program from Pearson’s.
First, in this section, I will consider a debate which occurred in
the correspondence pages of Nature between Weldon, Pearson, Joseph T. Cunningham, and E. Ray Lankester.12 In the next section, I
will examine two other sources—a lecture which Weldon wrote for
a volume on the methods of science and the ﬁrst paper Weldon
wrote with Galton, before his collaboration with Pearson began.
The Nature debate is yet another chapter in the long and storied
argument between the biometricians and their Batesonian (and later Mendelian) opponents. We should begin by setting the stage.
2.1. The opposition
The level of acrimony between the opponents and supporters of
biometry around 1900 is indeed legendary. It would take a monograph to describe this conﬂict in detail, but a little context is useful
here. We begin with the publication of Bateson’s Materials for the
Study of Evolution in 1894 (Provine, 1971; Sloan, 2000, p. 1074).
Bateson worried, as Cock argues, about the twin problems of the
usefulness of small variations and the difﬁculty of preserving variation over time (Cock, 1973, p. 8). These issues coalesced a community of scientists concerned with, ﬁrst and foremost,
describing the mechanism of heredity.
We can see many levels of disagreement between, on one side,
Bateson, his allies, and even, as we will see below, scientists as diverse as E. Ray Lankester (a British Haeckelian and dyed-in-thewool defender of Darwin) and J. T. Cunningham (a highly inﬂuential British neo-Lamarckian)—and, on the other, the early biometrical school of Pearson and Weldon. First, the biometrical method
was highly technical. The life sciences had engaged in research
for centuries without the aid of complex mathematics, and many
practitioners saw no need for it now.
Secondly, the Batesonian group was convinced that the sort of
variation that would resolve their problems would be discontinuous. Cock and Forsdyke (2008, part V) argue that if one issue can
be said to have motivated William Bateson throughout his career,
it is the conviction that there was something qualitatively different
about the discontinuous variation responsible for the generation of
new species. The biometricians, in contrast, were committed gradualists—staunch defenders of an orthodox Darwinism (Froggatt &
Nevin, 1971, p. 10).
Further, Pearson and Weldon, as I noted in the ﬁrst section,
explicitly deemphasized in their biometrical methodology the discovery of the physical mechanism of heredity. The Batesonians,
therefore, failed to see how Pearson and Weldon’s statistical methods could even be relevant to the study of evolution. Observational
work ought to intend, as that in Bateson’s Materials did, to test and
explain theories of heredity like theirs. These theories are not the
sorts of things even subject to investigation using Pearson’s unnecessarily complicated tools. A later, though representative, statement of the objection can be found in a critique by Bateson of
one of Pearson’s later works:
. . . much of the statistical work produced by Professor Pearson
and his followers has, I believe, gone wide of its mark, if that
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aim is the elucidation of Evolution. More ﬁtly might this work
be described as ‘‘Mathematical Contributions to a Theory of
Normality.’’ [. . .] By the one word Variation we are attempting
to express a great diversity of phenomena in their essence distinct though merging insensibly with each other. The attempt to
treat or study [these phenomena] as similar [i.e., by using
advanced statistics like Pearson’s] is leading to utter confusion
in the study of evolution. (Bateson, 1901, pp. 203–204)13
Looking at the statistics which so interested Pearson, Bateson
claims, smoothes over precisely the sorts of differences we are concerned with capturing in the study of evolutionary variation.
This dispute was further complicated by some preexisting bitterness between Weldon and Bateson—Weldon had written an
unfavorable review of Bateson’s Materials, and Weldon and Bateson
had argued at length in the correspondence pages of Nature in
1895 about an issue concerning the Cineraria, a genus of small,
shrub-like ﬂowering plants (Cock, 1973, p. 8). In the same year,
Weldon had spearheaded the organization of the Evolution Committee of the Royal Society as a haven for biometrical work. After
Bateson and his allies roundly criticized Weldon’s article on the
evolution of crabs (about which more later), Galton pressured Weldon to place Bateson on the committee. Bateson promptly took
over and stacked the committee, causing Pearson and Weldon to
ﬁnally resign in 1900 (Froggatt & Nevin, 1971, p. 9; Pearson,
1936, p. 228). Shortly thereafter, the hostile climate for the biometricians spurred the founding of the journal Biometrika, intended to
be a place for them to publish their works without interference
([Weldon, Pearson, and Davenport], 1901). At this point, the dispute between Bateson and Weldon had become so bitter that Weldon called it ‘‘paltry and dirty beyond measure’’ (quoted in
Magnello, 1998, p. 72).
Lastly, we have the role of Mendel. After the ‘‘rediscovery’’ of
Mendel’s paper and the publication of its translation in the Journal
of the Royal Horticultural Society (Druery & Bateson, 1901), the Batesonians eagerly picked up Mendel’s banner, in large part because
they felt his theory would be a highly useful way to approach their
concerns in both heredity and breeding (Darden, 1977; Olby,
1987).14 Despite attempts by some at the time to synthesize the
work of the biometricians and the Mendelians, Mendelian genetics
rapidly became the front line in this controversy—and the Mendelians rapidly won converts.15 From 1900 until 1906, the story for
the biometricians is one of a steady loss of allies, as attempts were
made to discover how the Law of Ancestral Heredity, a central biometrical principle which Pearson had extended from Galton’s original formulation, might be related to Mendelian inheritance
(Pearson, 1898, 1904; Weldon, 1902). Weldon’s death in 1906 precipitated Pearson’s retirement from the study of evolution, and he
would attend only one meeting of the British Association after
1904 (Pearson, 1936, p. 231). Until the early synthetic work of Fisher
(1918, 1922), leading to the later contributions of authors like
Wright and Dobzhansky, the Mendelians carried the day.
2.2. The debate begins
I want to narrow the focus, however, to one particular debate
between Pearson, Weldon, and two opponents that took place in
the letters to Nature in 1895 and 1896. This exchange has been discussed before: Bowler (1992, p. 4) cites it as evidence that the Darwinians during the ‘‘eclipse of Darwinism’’ weren’t able ‘‘to

12
In general, these ‘‘paradigm articulators’’ (to use the phrase of Kim (1994)) are not well known, excepting Lankester (see Lester & Bowler, 1995). See Ankeny (2000) and
Tabery (2004) for further study of two other important, smaller players in these debates.
13
‘‘Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution’’ was the title of a series of more than a dozen papers Pearson wrote during his collaboration with Weldon.
14
See, however, Pearson (1908), Magnello (2004), and Porter (2005) for the complexity of the biometricians’ response to Mendel. For the impact of Mendel in other ﬁelds, see
Roll-Hansen (2000).
15
On these near-syntheses, see Tabery (2004) and Morrison (2002).
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maintain a uniﬁed front’’ against their opponents.16 But this
(admittedly accurate) portrayal conceals a very interesting aspect
of the exchange: the insight it brings into the relationship between
Pearson and Weldon on deep, philosophical points. First, a brief discussion of the context in which the discussion took place.
In March of 1895, Weldon published a summary of his seminal
paper on the statistical analysis of measurements of the crab Carcinus maenas.17 Weldon had collected extensive data on several morphological quantities of interest—one of which, ‘‘frontal breadth’’ (a
relatively unimpressive morphological characteristic of these crabs),
he claimed could be shown to be under selective pressure. Pearson’s
inﬂuence on the paper was extensive, as the amount of statistical work
required to demonstrate the inﬂuence of selection was massive. First,
one had to normalize for the simple growth of the crabs over their lifespan (a profoundly difﬁcult statistical feat), and discard data for obviously wounded or malformed crabs. Once this was done, Pearson
believed he had arrived at a slightly non-normal distribution for frontal
breadth. This distribution curve could be factorized (using a new
method which Pearson had just developed) into the superposition of
two normal curves. The crucial claim was that this superposition provided evidence that the population itself was bimodal—that is, that
natural selection had split the population into two sub-groups which
were evolving away from one another. Weldon hypothesized that
the selective pressure at work was due to the turbidity of the water
at various places in the crabs’ environment.
It is not surprising, given the tenuous nature of these inferences,
that controversy soon developed. The ﬁrst encounter on the Nature
correspondence pages occurred when the botanist William T. Thiselton-Dyer submitted a letter commenting on Weldon’s paper
(Thiselton-Dyer, 1895).18 Thiselton-Dyer believed that the statistical
method could be used to shed light on the ‘‘stability problem’’—the
tendency of a ‘‘mean speciﬁc form’’ to be preserved in a population.
This was quite a live question in the biological community in 1895—
Galton would present a request to the Entomological Society just
three weeks after Thiselton-Dyer’s letter was published, asking
‘‘those who have had experience in breeding’’ for data bearing on
‘‘a theoretical question of much importance; namely, the part played
in Evolution by ‘organic stability’’’ (Galton, 1895, p. 155). Galton’s
proposal of the Law of Regression had attempted to formalize the
observation that, as he put it, ‘‘offspring [plants] did not tend to
resemble their parent seeds in size, but to be always more mediocre
than they’’ (Galton, 1886, p. 246). It was a solution to this problem
which Thiselton-Dyer believed he had spotted in Weldon’s work.
But despite his optimism that statistical methods might be used
to solve problems of regression, Thiselton-Dyer was more skeptical
when it came to Weldon’s methodological claims:
I am not sure that I quite understand Prof. Weldon when he says
that ‘‘the statistical method is the only one at present obvious
by which [the Darwinian] hypothesis can be experimentally
checked.’’ In the ﬁrst place, I should myself hardly call it experimental at all. In the next place . . . in the important cases where
evolution is actually taking place, the mathematical analysis
appears to me to be beset with very great difﬁculties. (Thiselton-Dyer, 1895, p. 461)
Thiselton-Dyer, it seems, entirely missed the point—conﬁrmed by the
fact that both the biometricians and their opposition cite him as an
opponent. He managed to read into Weldon a concern—namely, the
demonstration of the law of regression to the mean—in which Weldon had little interest, and ﬂatly dismissed as unintelligible the point
16
17
18
19
20

that Weldon was actually trying to make. (As it turns out, the statistical method is highly amenable to the explication of regression to the
mean—Pearson would publish a paper doing precisely that the following year (Pearson, 1896b, p. 306ff).)
Nonetheless, the ﬂoodgates had opened—spurred, no doubt, by
Thiselton-Dyer citing one of the most controversial statements in
Weldon’s paper—and the parties to the debate quickly formed: J.
T. Cunningham and E. Ray Lankester on one side, and Weldon on
the other.19
Joseph T. Cunningham was a marine biologist and zoologist at
the Marine Research Station at Granton, whom Bowler has called
‘‘an important but by no means typical British Lamarckian’’ (Bowler, 1992, p. 89). He was deeply engaged in the battle against Weismann; his obituary read that ‘‘he remained to the last one of the
most eminent of the neo-Lamarckians’’ (Mudge, 1935, p. 42). E.
Ray Lankester, on the other hand, ‘‘was one of the giants of latenineteenth-century British science,’’ and had positioned himself
as ‘‘a champion of the Darwinian selection theory against Lamarckism’’ (Lester and Bowler, 1995, pp. 1, 87). But he was very interested in the German or Haeckelian version of the ‘‘problem of
variation,’’ espousing a theory of ‘‘correlated variation,’’ according
to which variation ‘‘is limited by the already selected and emphasized characteristics of the group. Every part . . . varies in accordance with the constitutional tendency of the organism, which
may be called its ancestral bias, or group bias.’’20 With ﬁgures as
inﬂuential as these lined up against Pearson and Weldon, and given
the confusing content of the string of Nature letters, a reconstruction
of the play-by-play is bound to be useful here.
The ﬁrst letter following Thiselton-Dyer’s was from Cunningham (1895), who brought with him an exceptional dose of methodological vitriol. After claiming that all Weldon had done was to
show that some future demonstration of natural selection might
be possible using statistical methods, he railed that:
Prof. Weldon says that if we know that a given deviation from
the mean is associated with a greater or less percentage of
death-rate, we do not require to know how the increase or
decrease of death-rate is brought about, and all ideas of functional adaptation become unnecessary. This may be his own
state of mind on the subject, but I venture to state that it is
not Darwinism, and that he cannot shut others out from the
most interesting and most important ﬁelds of biology in this
way. (Cunningham, 1895, p. 510)
Not only, then, are statistical methods good for delivering us little
more than a promissory note on future results, Weldon’s methodological prescriptions actually hinder the advancement of biological
science.
After this outburst, the debate fell silent for a little more than a
year. In June of 1896, Alfred Russel Wallace presented a paper to
the Linnean Society regarding the existence and utility of the ‘‘speciﬁc character,’’ or the set of characteristics that separate a species
from the other members of its genus. Lankester wrote to Nature,
ostensibly to comment on the views of Wallace. But his intent
was clearly otherwise: he said outright that his ‘‘chief object in
writing this letter is to draw attention to the views of Prof. Weldon’’ (Lankester, 1896a, p. 245).
As Lankester tells the story in his letter, during the discussion at
the Linnean Society after the reading of Wallace’s paper, he had argued for the importance of his ‘‘correlation of variation.’’ Weldon
declared Lankester’s theory entirely irrelevant, because (again, as

It is also brieﬂy mentioned by Olby (1989) and Plutynski (2006).
The original is Weldon (1895a); the summary printed in Nature is Weldon (1895b).
This letter is also known for sparking the debate over the origin of the cultivated Cineraria, mentioned earlier (Froggatt & Nevin, 1971, p. 9).
Some of the more interesting letters include Cunningham (1895), Lankester (1896a, 1896b), Pearson (1896a), and Weldon (1896a, 1896b).
From the Lankester papers, privately held, quoted in Lester (1995), p. 89.
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reported by Lankester) given a case of two characters, both of
which are positively correlated with favorable selection, it is ‘‘absolutely impossible to separate these two correlated phenomena. The
coloured skin is as much a cause of the survival of the dark man as
is the germ-destroying property of his blood’’ (Lankester, 1896a, p.
245).
Lankester was dumbfounded. ‘‘I was not prepared,’’ he laments,
‘‘for an empty wrangle in regard to the proper uses or improper
uses of the word ‘cause’’’ (Lankester, 1896a, pp. 245–246). Lankester immediately proceeded to a philosophical debate over Weldon’s
use of causation. He claimed that Weldon
has deliberately departed from the simple statement which his
observations warranted, viz., that such-and-such a proportion
of frontal measurement accompanies survival, and has unwarrantably (that is to say unreasonably) proceeded to speak of
the ‘‘effect’’ of this frontal proportion, to declare it to be a cause
of survival, to estimate the ‘‘advantage’’ and ‘‘disadvantage’’ of
this same proportion, and ﬁnally to maintain that its ‘‘importance’’ may be estimated without troubling ourselves to inquire
how it operates, or whether indeed it operates at all. (Lankester,
1896a, p. 246, original emphasis)
I have quoted this passage at some length to give an idea of the
philosophical level on which this debate took place. Importantly,
we see a shift from the position of Cunningham to that of Lankester.
For Cunningham, the problem is merely about the methodological
claims of biometry: statistical investigation of correlation is ﬁne,
he seems to say, but it cannot constitute a replacement for comparative physiology and the investigation of functional adaptations (a
point with which, we will see, Weldon actually agrees). Lankester,
on the other hand, seems to indict Weldon for philosophical mistakes. Weldon’s underlying philosophy of science is inadequate if it
leads him to think that the discovery of correlation is sufﬁcient to
determine causal inﬂuence. Lankester’s letter closes by asserting
that biometrical methods ‘‘appear to me not merely inadequate,
but in so far as they involve perversion of the meaning of accepted
terms and a deliberate rejection of the method of inquiry by
hypothesis and veriﬁcation, injurious to the progress of knowledge’’
(Lankester, 1896a, p. 246).
Weldon responded to Lankester’s letter with one of his own,
and if there were any doubt that the argument had become genuinely philosophical by this point, his response should remove it.
Weldon quoted, at length, Hume’s deﬁnition, from the Enquiry, of
cause as constant conjunction, and challenged Lankester as to
whether he had the audacity to disagree with Hume (Weldon,
1896a, p. 294). Weldon stated he only ever intended to discuss
cause under Hume’s deﬁnition ‘‘or in Kant’s extension of it [!];
but Prof. Lankester seems to go beyond it’’ (Weldon, 1896a, p. 294).
Lankester rushed to the defense of the Humean acceptability of
his method, claiming that he merely desired, given the existence of
two features correlated with some positive outcome, to engage in a
process of hypothesis and experiment in order to determine the
‘‘true order and relation’’ of ‘‘a complex group of related phenomena’’ (Lankester, 1896b, p. 366).
Weldon, perhaps ﬁnally realizing in full detail the proposition
with which he was disagreeing, beat a hasty retreat in August of
1896 (Weldon, 1896b). He explained that he was ‘‘far from rejecting the method of imaginative hypothesis and subsequent experiment and observation.’’ ‘‘A complete knowledge,’’ he wrote, ‘‘of the
processes associated with this relation between frontal breadth
and death-rate is a thing of very great interest, and I believe, as
ﬁrmly as Prof. Lankester, that every effort should be made to attain
to it’’ (Weldon, 1896b, p. 413). Though such a theory is quite hard
to obtain (even, perhaps, impossible) due to the complexity of the
interrelations of the organs of any organism, it must nonetheless
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be sought. Weldon would indeed undertake a series of experiments
attempting to determine the inﬂuence on the crabs of the amount
of silt in their water in 1897 and 1898, concluding that ‘‘a narrow
frontal breadth renders one part of the process of ﬁltration of water
more efﬁcient than it is in crabs of greater frontal breadth’’ (Weldon, 1898, p. 901; Pearson, 1906, pp. 26–27).
It is worth pausing here to note that this letter and Weldon’s
subsequent experiments, despite their appearances, do not necessarily constitute a motivational retreat on Weldon’s part. For both
the claims that hypothesis and experiment are a good way to guide
our future statistical research, and that more detailed knowledge of
the correlations at issue in a given biological system is a desirable
thing, are fully consistent with Weldon’s belief that the correlations
are the complete and sufﬁcient endpoint of biological research. But
more on this in the next section.
Surprisingly, Pearson entered the debate at this point, with a response countering Weldon (Pearson, 1896a). Pearson began by
arguing that the statistical analysis in Weldon’s 1895 paper was
far too simplistic to constitute a genuine veriﬁcation of natural
selection. Given the complex nature of the assumptions regarding
the general growth of the crabs that had to be made, Pearson declares it ‘‘very improbable’’ that the true growth curve was found.
Further, he writes that ‘‘when the law of the growth of crabs has
been accurately ascertained . . . I am convinced that it will require
much more complex analysis than that of the Report to ascertain
whether a selective death-rate does or does not exist’’ (Pearson,
1896a, p. 460). Then, Pearson turned to the defense of a concept
of causation as more than mere Humean event-correlation. Even
if the data in Weldon’s 1895 paper were perfect, Pearson claimed,
it would still not be enough to show that frontal-breadth is the
cause of death-rate. ‘‘Very probably it may be, but the demonstration is not logically complete, or at any rate a deﬁnition of cause
has been adopted which does not appear of much utility to science’’ (Pearson, 1896a, pp. 460–461). As an example, he turns to
a discussion of artiﬁcial selection in cows, describing what contemporary philosophy of biology would recognize as the difference between selection of and selection for—both establish correlations,
only one (selection for) involves causation. Without much more research, he claims, ‘‘it seems to me that a link is really missing in the
chain of demonstration’’ (Pearson, 1896a, p. 461). After Pearson’s
input, the discussion tapered off.
On the traditional reading of the relationship between Pearson
and Weldon, we should by no means expect a disagreement here,
nor should we expect a disagreement of this kind. Pearson and
Weldon, it is alleged, shared precisely the same view of science
and the role of statistics. Yet it is on these fundamental issues that
Pearson and Weldon disagree here. Let us consider a few more
sources.
3. Weldon on statistics
In 1906, the year of his death, Weldon contributed a piece on
‘‘Inheritance in Animals and Plants’’ to a collection of lectures on
scientiﬁc method (Weldon, 1906). Its breadth and central concerns
are quite exciting—Weldon offers a sustained defense of the use of
statistical methods in science, both generally and with particular
emphasis on the biological sciences.
Why would statistical methods require a defense? According to
Weldon, they inherently require a compromise—a methodological
value judgment by a group of scientiﬁc practitioners. ‘‘Men measure a certain thing,’’ he writes, ‘‘and ﬁnd that up to a certain point
their measurements agree with each other, and their experience is
uniform; but beyond that point [i.e., in the very ﬁne details], their
experience is contradictory’’ (Weldon, 1906, p. 88). We can use
statistics to smooth over these contradictory results (e.g., by
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averaging), but at a price—we must decide ‘‘how far the variability
of the actual experience depends on imperfect observation, and
how far it is a true record of differences in the thing measured’’
(Weldon, 1906, p. 88). What we truly desire—in Weldon’s words,
the ‘‘ideal description of every experience, the description which
alone makes further progress possible’’ (Weldon, 1906, p. 93)—is
the correct description of all the observed results, without having
neglected any inconsistencies whatsoever. Physics and chemistry
possess successful, general, formal methods because they have
‘‘succeeded in conﬁning the limits within which these inconsistencies occur, so that the proportion of the whole experience affected
by them is very small. But biologists have not yet advanced so far
as this: the margin of uncertainty in their experience is so large
that they are obliged to take account of it in every statement that
they make’’ (Weldon, 1906, p. 93). That is, physics and chemistry
have advanced theoretically to the point that these disciplines
are conﬁdent that they can sort any discrepancies in their standard
processes of measurement into clear, well-marked types: either
they are a result of individual failings of experimenter or apparatus, or they are an indication that the fundamental theory needs
to be reﬁned.
Biology, however, is a different story. We do not yet know enough about the underlying structure of biological systems to know
what constitutes important or unimportant variation. Weldon offers an example:
If we want to make a statement about the stature of Englishmen, we must ﬁnd a way of describing our whole experience;
we must ﬁnd some simple way of describing our whole experience, so that we can easily remember and communicate to others how many men of any given height we ﬁnd among a
thousand Englishmen. We must give up the attempt to replace
our experiences by a simple average value and try to describe
the whole series of results our observation has yielded. (Weldon, 1906, p. 94)
The gist is this: physicists have more knowledge regarding their
experimental systems, and work tirelessly at searching for sources
of error. All in all, they are in a much better position than biologists
to render themselves conﬁdent that any variation within a set of
measurements is due to operator error. They can then take the
mean, and (given their precautions) assume that, for all practical
purposes, they have arrived at the correct answer. Such a claim is
consistent with Weldon’s paradigm for statistics in physics being
its use to correct for errors in observational astronomy (Porter,
1986, pp. 95–96). In biology, we cannot yet do this—due to the
peculiarities of biological systems (especially their complexity),
and our lack of knowledge, we can almost never simplify our observations in this way. We must therefore strive to preserve all their
details, in a manner which still may be communicated—and, as
you may have guessed, statistics is how we accomplish such a feat.
We should now have enough of a grip on Weldon’s thought to try
to articulate his view of biological method. Statistics is essential to
the investigation of biological systems, due to their vast complexity
and our lack of comprehension of their ﬁne-structure. However, statistics is not essential for the reason we ascribed to Pearson—the primary motivation for using statistics is not to simplify or economize
data for limited knowers, though this is certainly part of its merit. Its
main purpose is rather to permit us to retain (as much as is possible)
the complexity of the biological world. Any overzealous act of simpliﬁcation (in Weldon’s example, by doing things like substituting
averages for statistical distributions) is equivalent to claiming that
any remaining variation in our data is an artifact, not a feature of
the outside world. We must use statistics (and keep the entirety of
the statistical distribution intact) in order to hold on to the range
of observational data which nature gives us.

We can see this same statistical philosophy in Weldon’s earlier
works. In his ﬁrst publication to use statistical methodology, Weldon, with the help of Francis Galton, endeavored to draw conclusions from some data on shrimp (Weldon, 1890). By the standards
of his later work with Pearson, his methods are horribly primitive—they simply consist in measuring the data’s absolute deviation
from a normal curve provided by Galton. The stated goal of the paper
is to ‘‘determine the degree of accuracy with which [the] adjustment
[of a local variety to its environment] is effected, and the law which
governs the occurrence of deviations from the average’’ (Weldon,
1890, p. 445). In other words, since no character of any organism is
perfectly adapted to its environment, and assuming that the mean
value constitutes the (selective) optimum, to what extent do organisms deviate from this optimum? Galton had proposed a curve (the
‘‘law of error,’’ known today as the normal distribution) as an answer
to this question, extracted from his empirical studies, and Weldon
aimed to test this proposed solution in his shrimp.
Interestingly, however, the conclusions of the paper are broader
than this. Weldon collected his measurements, and noted that, indeed, all the characters he measured were normally distributed—
with, however, different means and standard deviations in the
three environments from which he collected the shrimp. But he
also considers as conﬁrmed a stronger proposal of Galton’s,
namely, that even though selective pressures ‘‘must vary in intensity in different places,’’ ‘‘the frequency with which the observed
deviations from the average occur is in all three cases expressed
by a curve of error’’ (Weldon, 1890, p. 451). That is, though natural
selection can alter the mean and standard deviation of a given
character, the characters in any environment, under any selective
pressure, will remain normally distributed.
We cannot infer from this paper anything like the statistical and
methodological sophistication which would later come to the biometrical school after many years of developing its tools and techniques. But we can see, sixteen years before publication of the
‘‘Inheritance’’ lecture, the ﬁrst glimmers of Weldon’s statistical philosophy of science. The variations present in his shrimp, he writes,
‘‘depend not only on the variability of the individuals themselves
(which is possibly nearly alike in all races), but also on the selective
action of the surrounding conditions’’ (Weldon, 1890, p. 451).
Clearly, these causes are too complex to allow our exact treatment.
And we cannot rely on the mean values either, ‘‘for I am aware of
no case in which the individuals composing any race of animals—
however small and isolated the area in which they live, however uniform the conditions which obtain throughout that area—have been
shown to resemble one another exactly in any character’’ (Weldon,
1890, p. 445). To accept the mean value is to discard important information about the population. In order to preserve necessary variation in the data, then, we must focus on the normal distribution
itself—it is only at this level that we are permitted to draw conclusions about the population. Weldon’s view here may lack the precision of his later formulations, but we see all of its important features.
Finally, we should return to Weldon’s contribution to the Nature
debate in 1895 and 1896. With this understanding of Weldon’s statistical philosophy, we can easily see why he would adopt a ‘‘Humean’’ deﬁnition of cause. It is not an empiricist worry about the
legitimacy of the imposition of a necessary structure on nature (à
la Hume) that drives Weldon to such a position—rather, it is his
recognition that the structure of biological systems is far too intricate to make such a determination possible. Correlation (which
Weldon seems to think is similar to, or at least acceptable on the
standards of, Humean ‘‘constant conjunction’’) is the only type of
connection that can be drawn between biological systems of the
kind Weldon was interested in investigating without discarding
some of the essential features of these systems. To single out one
cause and one effect is to commit precisely the same fallacy as
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substituting the mean for the statistical distribution—it is to unjustiﬁably decide that some aspect of one’s data (whether variability
or a consistent correlation) is unimportant.
It is also easy to understand Weldon’s response to Lankester’s
persistent probing. For Weldon clearly thought that investigation
into particular facets of biological systems was worth undertaking—he did so himself. And such investigation is fully compatible
with his philosophy as I have laid it out here: there is nothing dishonest about attempting to understand more fully the detailed
nature of organisms—as long as such knowledge does not come
with the implication that some features of organisms are to be
privileged at the expense of others. To use Lankester’s example,
‘‘the coloured skin’’ and ‘‘the germ-destroying property of his
blood’’ both cause ‘‘the survival of the dark man’’ on Weldon’s view
because they are both elements of the broad, complex picture of
such a human being (Lankester, 1896a, p. 245). Any attempt to
choose one of these over the other must necessarily discard vitally
important information, unless and until the correlation itself
breaks down (e.g., when we detect ‘‘coloured’’ individuals without
the property of exceptional survival ‘‘in malarial regions’’).
Recall from the ﬁrst section that Pearson’s engagement with
biometry is best interpreted in the light of his positivist philosophy
of science. Statistical correlation, for Pearson, is one step in the process of determining the precise mathematical laws or causes
underlying a given biological system. We can now see clear evidence that Weldon, on the contrary, enters statistical practice out
of a much more broadly empiricist concern for the preservation
of variation in biological systems. For this is precisely what Weldon
means when he speaks of ‘‘describing our whole experience’’—statistics is the enterprise that lets us preserve and study the full
range of biological phenomena. It is a grave methodological error
to attempt to simplify away—to attempt to economize—this data,
even when we might think we have good reasons for ignoring certain correlations or variability. Furthermore, why would we need
to do so when we have the tools of biometry available to us, which
allow us to study biological systems in the full array of their natural variety?
4. Conclusions
With a novel conception of Weldon’s philosophy of science in
hand, we can turn to reevaluating the relationship between Pearson and Weldon. While their overall methodologies were all but
identical, as were their ideas of valuable data and good experimental process, this agreement masks the fact that their motivations
for engaging in statistics were interestingly divergent. Pearson, I
have argued, views statistics as a tool for positivist simpliﬁcation,
while Weldon sees it as essential for the preservation of variation.
On such a view, the tension between Pearson and Weldon concerning the notion of causation (as reﬂected in the Nature debate)
becomes manifest—and fully explicable. Pearson has adopted a positivist view of causation—we want to examine biological systems
until we can reduce their behavior into a series of simple mathematical laws. When we know these laws, we will have the only thing
which might pass for ‘‘causal’’ knowledge in biology. Weldon, on
the other hand, has adopted what we might call a statistical view
of causation—the only way in which we may accurately claim ‘‘causal’’ knowledge of a system, without destructive simpliﬁcation, is to
point to correlations within the system as a whole. Such correlations,
on Pearson’s philosophy, would constitute a very weak sort of causation—they would be clearly necessary for a causal link between two
features, but far from sufﬁcient. That is, a correlation is a form of
functional relationship of the variety Pearson recognized, but an
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unacceptably weak one. The sharpening of these simple correlations
into true laws must be one of the projects of a positivist biometry. It
is obvious, then, that Pearson would decry Weldon’s view as ‘‘a definition of cause . . . which does not appear of much utility to science’’
(Pearson, 1896a, pp. 460–461).
We might reconstruct the traditional view of the biometrical
school as follows. Pearson and Weldon both engage in the biometrical project motivated by the need to preserve the wide ranging
variation found in biological systems, and grounded in a philosophy of science that is broadly positivist. There is, on this view, no
real philosophical or motivational difference between the two
scientists.
This view must be substantially revised. Pearson, indeed, does
seem to engage in the biometrical program on broadly positivist
philosophical grounds. But his motivation for working in statistics
does not focus on diversity, but rather simpliﬁcation and economization of thought, a central positivist tenet, best interpreted in
light of his Grammar of Science and other positivist writings. Weldon, on the other hand, holds a profoundly different motivation,
a more traditionally empiricist reliance on the diversity of biological phenomena.
At a minimum, this much is interesting to the study of the history of biology. Weldon is a profoundly intriguing character in the
life sciences around the turn of the twentieth century, though his
work and thought are vastly under-studied. His rich form of empiricism impelled him to approach the great diversity of biological
observation as a necessary and even beautiful feature of life.21
Far from it being our duty to take this diversity and simplify it by
using statistical tools, Weldon claimed that ‘‘it is the ﬁrst business
of a scientiﬁc man to describe some portion of human experience
as exactly as possible. It does not matter in the least what kind of
experience he chooses to collect; his ﬁrst business is to describe
it’’ (Weldon, 1906, p. 81).
We can, however, say more. Pearson and Weldon, on this reading, came to the biometrical school with interestingly different
motivations. In spite of this, though, they converged on precisely
the same methodological tools, and became the closest of collaborators. This case study thus makes trouble for our intuitions
regarding the connection between statistical motivations and
methods. It is not necessarily the case that the presence of identical
methodologies is an indicator of identical motivations.
The general thesis that motivations are necessarily tied to
methods is, therefore, false. The biometrical case study, however,
shows us precisely why the question of the relationship between
methods and motivations is interesting in the ﬁrst place. For Pearson and Weldon, teasing out their reasons for taking up the tools of
statistics reveals those reasons to be carefully nuanced and philosophically sophisticated. The history of statistics, particularly in
the formative years of the late nineteenth century, proves to be
an impressive locus for historical actors engaging in relatively
overt theoretical and philosophical writing (certainly more overt
than was usual for a naturalist like Weldon). As these ﬁgures attempted to decide whether or not to apply statistical reasoning
to their areas of research, and then went on to justify to themselves
and others the roles that these new tools were to play, they found
an entirely novel and challenging set of problems yet to be solved.
More research remains to be done on cases such as these, but the
biometrical school offers us a profoundly interesting example.
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